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WOMEN LITIGATORS IN SEARCH OF A
CARE-ORIENTED JUDICIAL SYSTEM
JENNIFER A. FREYER*
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser - in
fees, expenses and waste of time. As a peacemake, the lawyer has a
superior opportunity of being a good man. Never stir up litigation. A
worse man can scarcely be found than one who does this. Who can be more
nearly a fiend than he who habitually overhauls the register of deeds in
search of defects in titles, whereupon to stir up strife and put money in his
pocket? A moral tone ought to be enforced in the profession which would
drive such men out of it.1
-Abraham Lincoln
I. INTRODUCTION
As one commentator states, "some of the best battles in this country
take place in ... courtroom[s]."2  Characteristic of American
courtroom battles, the attorneys fighting them are frequently
described as "aggressive," "combative," and "ruthless." In a society
* J.D. Candidate, Washington College of Law at The American University, 1996; B.A., St.
Michael's College, 1992. I would like to thank Professor Mary Ellen Barbera, Adjunct,
Washington College of Law, The American University; Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief
of Criminal Appeals Division, Office of Attorney General of Maryland, for her ideas, advice, and
encouragement in writing this comment.
1. WHITNEYNORTH SEYMOUR, WHYJusTICEFAILS 14(1973). "Abraham Lincoln personified
the lawyer of compassion and high ethical standards. Those who knew him when he was a trial
lawyer in Illinois spoke of his fairness, his concern for others, his integrity, his warmth and
humor." Id. at 14.
2. EMILY CouRic, THE TRIAL LAWYERS: THE NATIONS TOP LITIGATORS TELL How THEYWIN
xiii (1988).
3. See generally Lynn Hecht Schafran, Abilities vs. Assumptions: Women as Litigators, TRIAL,
Aug. 1983, at 37 (discussing common stereotypes of courtroom litigators). For a portrayal of
how women trial attorneys have been characterized by the press, with emphasis on prosecutor,
Marcia Clark in the Oj. Simpson case, see generally Laurel G. Bellows, Looking Through Law's Glass
Ceiling, CHICAGO TRiB., June 2, 1991, at 15; Graeme Browning, Advocates for Chang&; Female
Attorneys Crack A Traditional Male Domain - Trial Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 25,1989, at Fl; Lynda
Gorov,Justice on the Chic Fashion Makes a Statement in Simpson Case BOSTON GLOBE,June 30, 1994,
at 55; Female Lawyers Taught to Emote' in Courtroom, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 1988, at B5; Joy
Horowitz, The Defender Some Say Leslie Abramson is the Best Female Criminal Defense Lawyer Around.
Others Say She's The Best, Period, LA. TIMES, July 23, 1989, at 8; Josh Meyer, O.J. 's Prosecutor
Described as Tough, Thorough, Successful, MIAMI HERALD, July 3, 1994, at A7; Josh Meyer, A
Reluctant Headliner Deputy D.A. Marcia Clark Likes the Challenge of High-Profile Cases - But Not the
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of limited resources, where rules and duties govern how we relate to
each other, it is expected that competition abounds and individual
achievement is the primary goal.4 An inferred requirement of this
competitive system is that those wishing to fight their battles in the
courtroom must employ lawyers to act as their "hired gun."5 On the
other hand, however, there are those who believe that society will
flourish, not because of rules and regulations that maintain order, but
because of people's sense of interdependence and concern for
community well-being.6 It is those people who believe thatjustice will
prevail in our society even when the system of law is imperfect.
Justice is an ideal that society has been in search of for centuries,
an ideal that conjures up visions of fairness and truth.7 The process
of courtroom litigation, however, has shifted our focus away from
fairness and truth.8 Litigation is a process of fighting for legal rights
that fosters courtroom battles. This is due to its adversarial nature
and its main objective: winning.9 Not only is justice sacrificed by
litigation, but so is the well-being of society1 ° anl the personal
morality of litigators, who are forced to step beyond the bounds of
their professional responsibilities in order to win at all cost."1 This
Publicity, LA TIMES, July 2, 1994, at A2; Style Threatens to Overcome Substance in OJ. Simpson Case,
CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 24, 1994, at 2.
4. See infra notes 28, 31 and accompanying text.
5. See generally RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL
DECISIONS 29 (1989) [hereinafter JACK &JACK] ("As defined by tradition and by professional
code, the job of a lawyer is to represent vigorously the position and interests of a client, to take
a client's place in the legal process.").
6. See infra note 63-66 and accompanying text.
7. SeegenerallyJ.R. LUCAS, ONJUSTICE (1980) (exploring the concept of"justice," including
fairness, rights and interests, equality, the law, and morality); see generally WHITNEY NORTH
SEYMOUR, JR., WHY JUSTICE FAILS (1973) (examining the institutions and participants of the
American judicial system in order to understand why justice fails in our society and proposing
several options for improving the criminal and civil justice systems).
8. See SEYMOUR, supra note 7, at 25 (1973) (stating that as a tactical device, it may be more
effective to avoid issues of truth and fairness and, instead, to simply attack the adversary). "In
modem times, the advice shared among lawyers is: 'When you are weak on the facts, argue the
law. When you are weak on the law, argue the facts. When you are weak on both the law and
the facts, attack the prosecution.'" I&
9. See generally JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 130 (illustrating that likening the work of
attorneys to a game is appropriate).
[B] ecause law can be understood as a contest with rules, winners, and losers .... [t] he
adversary nature of law makes it easy to maintain personal distance. From an
attorney's point of view, moral neutrality is easily reinterpreted to mean 'it's just a
game,' even though the stakes are often high and lawyers get deeply invested in the
contest. When taking part in a game, it is hard not to become preoccupied with
winning, by whatever the prescribed rules.
I&.
10. See generally JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981) (examining the
phenomena of litigation in American society and its underlying reasons and consequences).
11. JACK &JAC, supra note 5, at 96-97.
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is particularly true for women litigators, who often experience
conflicts between their professional expectations and natural
inclinations.1 2
How women litigators can implement more of their care-oriented
personal morality into a professional, rights-oriented role, without
being caught in the "double-bind," is the subject of this paper.
Competition may define the present legal culture,13 but women have
options other than surrendering and becoming more competitive or
rebelling and trying to revolutionize society. Women have more
feasible alternatives to offer the judicial system.
Section I proposes that the concept of justice has been misunder-
stood and, therefore, abandoned. Filling the vacuum, litigation
provides the adversarial process which is mistakenly believed to be the
best method of presenting a case and finding the truth. Section II
describes the adversarial nature of litigation and suggests that by
taking an analytical approach to justice, instead of a human contextu-
al approach, we move further away from justice. Section III defines
the "morality of rights" and the "morality of care" perspectives.
Section IV explains the role of a trial lawyer and shows the difficulties
of being care-oriented in the present legal system. Section V offers
a few ways that women litigators can change the mentality of
individual litigators and the litigation system to a more care-oriented
perspective. In conclusion, a society is made up of individuals who
may or may not wish to act for the community. Thus, litigators must
decide for themselves whether they will perpetuate the belief that
individuals each have rights irrespective of anyone else's, or whether
they will encourage their clients to take into account how their actions
affect others.
[P]rofessional responses for dealing with moral questions and social reality have an
esoteric quality that separate them from the everyday life responses formulated by most
people. Personal responses and assumptions are worked out over time, and have been
tested at least tentatively before an alternative professional morality is available to an
individual. To the extent that patterns have begun to solidify, new patterns make us
uncomfortable if they are at odds with the old .... Potential for strain adheres in any
profession that carries with it a morality of its own. So long as the moral assumptions
of a profession... are at odds with the everyday life morality of those who practice the
profession, a moral tension will exist.Id.
12. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing female litigators' conflicts
between their personal morality and professional responsibilities).
13. See generally, MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES 130 (1994)
(describing the adversarial nature of today's legal system, where one side of a case must always
"win" and one side has invariably "lost").
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All lawyers work under the auspices of an elaborate and detailed
code of ethics,14 which is often referred to as "professional morali-
ty.""5 For some attorneys, there is no discernible difference between
their professional ethics and their personal morals; their perceptions
as lawyers so mirror their personal beliefs that there is little or no
stress in reconciling their work with their personal ideals. 6 The
personal morality of such attorneys is usually what is referred to as the
"morality of rights."'" The "morality of rights" is similar to our
society's and judicial system's present focus on the importance of
individual autonomy and achievement. 8 For other attorneys, the
differences between their personal and professional ethics are so
acute that tension and stress result from an internal struggle to
resolve the dilemma. The personal morality of these attorneys is
usually what is referred to as the "morality of care." 9 The "morality
of care" conflicts with the "morality of rights" that governs the law
and, more particularly, litigation.2" "Morality of care" attorneys often
have difficulty maintaining their dual roles without sacrificing a little
of who they are because their professional roles are so demanding.
2
'
A further disparity is created because the majority of litigators who
are rights-oriented or are "morality of rights" thinkers, are men; and,
the majority of litigators who are care-oriented or are "morality of
14. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 1.
15. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 34 (defining the term "professional conduct" as "a type
of role-determined behavior in which the defining attributes of the role specify how a
professional relates to other people.").
16. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 97.
17. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 6 & n.15 (explaining why the authors chose to use the
term "morality of rights" instead of "morality of justice," as Carol Gilligan does in IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982), "because of the
place ofjustice in the legal system.").
18. See Sandrajanoff, The Influence Of Legal Education On Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV.
193, 203 (1991) (observing that the American legal system (including its law schools) is by
tradition rights-oriented, focusing on logic, formal reasoning and precedent); STUART A,
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAxwERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 17
(1974) (stating that the American political and legal system follows the rights and duties
delineated by the Constitution. Consequently, when analyzing problems, one should use legal
reasoning as it not only correctly incorporates current obligations and laws, but is also consistent
with constitutional values).
19. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 97 & n.16. The authors additionally note that they would
have preferred the more descriptive term "morality of responsiveness" but nonetheless chose
"morality of care" as it is a less awkward phrase. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 196 n.16.
20. SeeJACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 6 (relating that "[m] oral superiority is gauged in terms
of the relation of the self to the rules of society, with highest attainment emphasizing rights and
obligations, rules and principles, and questions ofjustice, fairness, reciprocity, and equality-all
concepts familiar in the American legal system.").
21. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 28-29 (noting that professional roles can be so pervasive
and time-consuming that they will often threaten one's definition of him or herself. Attorneys
in particular tend to surrender their self-identity-and also their loyalty to their personal
ideals-to the more powerful calling of the professional role).
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care" thinkers, are women.2 Consequently, male litigators less often
feel the tension between their personal and professional morality.
23
That makes the adjustment into their professional role, and their
professional experience as a whole, smoother than women's adjust-
ments.24 Female litigators' conflicts between their personal morality
and the responsibilities of the role they play' creates personal
dilemmas and, thus, hinders their transition into their role as
litigators. 26
One of the most prevalent and difficult dilemmas female trial
attorneys confront is the development of their professional style.
27
Women are trapped in a "double-bind"28 when they enter a court-
22. SeeJanoff, supra note 18, at 195-96 (citing studies of psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg
and Carol Gilligan in support of the proposition that women are more care-oriented and men
are more rights-oriented); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic For Lauryers, 81 GEO. L.J.
2665, 2665-66 (1993) (citing several books, law review, and journal articles to show the debate
over whether the ethic of care is exclusively the moral viewpoint of women and declaring that
"[t] he ethic of care, [Carol] Gilligan implies, is distinctively the ethical standpoint, or voice, of
women. Whether or not this characterization is true-and it has been the subject of intense
debate-Gilligan is careful to say that the ethic of care is also characteristic of at least some
men.");
That women have traditionally been the chief exponents of care morality is a cultural
and psychological fact but not a statement that this is the way it should be or the only
way it can be. Rights considerations are by no means foreign to moral decision making
for most women, and many men rely on care concerns in assessing moral conflicts.
Neither rights nor care thinking imprisons either gender. That women have
symbolized care values in the past does not mean they alone must embody them in the
future. What is critical is that they have nurtured those values and assumptions in the
private sphere to which they were culturally relegated and that they now make those
values available in the public sphere, particularly the public sphere of law. While the
two moralities coexist in society by a division of turf, law does not lend itself to
separation into public and private spheres. Law is part of the public sphere. Absent
the alternative of a division of spheres, the two moralities can exist together there only
by integration and balance-both in the institution of law and in the women and men
who ply the legal trade.
JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 157-58.
23. SeeJACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 99-105 (discussing how attorneys that strongly identify
with the morality of rights perspective do not tend to experience a moral conflict in meeting
their professional obligations).
24. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 99-105.
25. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 55.
26. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 99.
27. See generaliy Janet Taber, Marguerite T. Grant, Mary T. Huser, Rise B. Norman, James
R. Sutton, Clarence C. Wong, Louise E. Parker, and Claire Picard, Gender, Legal Education, and
the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1209 (1988) (relating that differences have been observed in women's and men's lawyering
styles). But see Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of Lauyering. a Response to Naomi Cahn,
43 HASTINGS LJ. 1071, 1073 (1992) (rejecting the treatment of gender as a question of style,
Professor Shalleck proposes that a feminist critique must explore how gender roles have become
intertwined into one's conception of being a lawyer).
28. Schafran, supra note 3, at 37 (defining "double-bind" as the predicament professional
women face in establishing their personal style); Naomi R. Cahn, Styles OfLaryeing, 43 HASTINGS
LJ. 1039, 1046 (1992) (citations omitted) (stating that when a male attorney displays atypical
male lawyering techniques (i.e., when he is not aggressive) he is merely regarded as favoring an
alternative "style." However, when a female attorney does not play a combative legal game, then
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room: one of style and one of objectives. If a woman displays a desire
to minimize harm to the relationship of the parties or a concern for
third parties, which is characteristic of the more feminine "morality
of care," she risks being judged as "too weak to be effective." 29 But,
if she adheres to the aggressive style of litigation and acts solely to
protect her client's interests against interference from others, as the
traditional male-oriented "morality of rights" system suggests is
appropriate, she risks being described as too pushy and cold-hearted,
even though those are traits that would be admired in a male
litigator.30
H. JUSTICE Is NO LONGER THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM
The many critics of the legal profession claim that lawyers are no
longer interested in bringing justice to society because they are too
consumed with their own pursuit of power and money." While
lawyers alone cannot be blamed for the way our judicial system has
progressed, it is apparent that society has lost sight of the ideal of
justice. For this reason, as lawyers, we must reevaluate our focus.
After all, "U]ustice is the bond of society, and without it, ... no
association of human individuals [can] subsist." 2  Unfortunately,
justice is often sacrificed because of the way society is structured:
A society composed of discrete individuals created as equal
encourages competition and dominance if resources are unequally
distributed and positions in society hierarchically arranged. The
ideals of equality speak to the right to run in the race but say
nothing about distribution of rewards at the finish. Each person
strives to secure a place in the social order, and because the places
at the finish line are far from equal, competition abounds. Rules
protect only the fairness of the contest ... if individual achieve-
ment is thought to be largely isolated from the welfare of others,
little inhibits the desire to race ahead. Only a sense of interdepen-
dence and community restrains competition and changes the goal
from individual to group success. A vision based on a network of
interdependencies encourages compromise and cooperation, for
she is more likely to be seen as too feminine and her skill as a lawyer may be doubted.).
29. Schafran, supra note 3, at 37.
30. Schafran, supra note 3, at 37.
31. BERTRAM HARNETF, LAW, LAWYERS, AND LAYMEN: MAKING SENSE OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 283 (1984) (noting as an example that wealthy corporate attorneys wield
significant influence over the American Bar Association by holding powerful positions in the
bar).
32. LUCAS, supra note 7, at 1 (1980) (citing DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 206 (1902)).
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your gain is also my gain. The world looks very different for those
who see themselves as competing for a place in the lifeboat than for
those already in the lifeboat working to keep it afloat.3
Justice, which was once seen as a guide for living peacefully with
others, is now viewed as an external force with which to be reck-
oned.' Similarly, law is intended to assist us in our relationships
with other individuals; however, when it is used solely to determine
competing rights and fails to recognize the mutual interests of the
parties, law serves to alienate us from each other. We have misunder-
stood justice and its role in our legal system and, as a consequence,
society has become increasingly divided. 5 As one commentator
states,
In a just society, there is ... no dissension, because it does not
matter whether decisions are taken by me or by someone else-they
will not conflict, because they are taken in the same frame of mind,
whoever it is that takes them-and yet this absence of conflict is
achieved ... by acceptance on the part of each of the existence
and legitimate interests of everybody else.36
The adversarial nature of litigation does not encourage, or even
allow for a resolution that is in the best interest of both parties to the
dispute; therefore, the degree of satisfaction felt by those parties
involved is greatly diminished. 7 When there is a win-lose situation,
with little or no compromise, there will always be at least one person
who believes at the end of the game that justice was not done.38 As
a society, we must seek justice,39 in order to avoid focusing on an
individual's exclusive rights, and in order to regain compassion and
understanding for the interests of others. By examining the nature
of the adversarial system of litigation, it is possible to recognize why
justice is no longer the primary goal of our judicial system and how
a more caring approach can be implemented.
33. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 9.
34. LUCAS, supra note 7, at 1.
35. LUCAs, supra note 7, at 1.
36. LuCAS, supra note 7, at 18-19.
37. See generally ROBERT FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
wrrHOUT GIVING IN 40-41 (2nd ed. 1991) (asserting that interests motivate people to decide
their positions). Further, "[w]hen you.., look behind opposed positions for the motivating
interests, you can often find an alternative position which meets not only your interests but
theirs as well." Id. at 42. Consequently, "shared interests and differing but complementary
interests can both serve as the building blocks for a wise agreement." Id. at 43.
38. HARNETT, supra note 31, at 13-14.
39. LuCAS, supra note 7, at 1.
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I. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A HuMAN,
CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO LITIGATION
Because of our strong attraction to the courtroom battle and our
uncompromising worship of the adversary model, we have accepted
the "Sport-Game Theory" of adjudication, despite occasional judicial
exhibitions to the contrary.' The love of a good fight is an integral
part of our national character, and we often value the adversary
contest more for itself than for what it produces."
Supporters of an adversarial process insist that because opposing
forces are more likely to elicit all the facts of a situation, such a system
is the most efficient and fair way of determining the truth.42
Although the civil legal system may not require a search for the
ultimate truth in order to bring justice to the parties and society, the
criminal legal system certainly requires such a search so that an
innocent person is not sent to prison. Justice is not the result
attained, however, when the adversarial battle between the lawyers
becomes more important than the truth.
43
The adversary character of both the civil and criminal systems make
them unreliable ways to achieve justice. The adversarial system is a
contest, where each side presents its case, as effectively and convinc-
ingly as possible, to an "impartial" judge or jury. 4 Some believe that
40. Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 403,448 (1992). The Supreme Court has also commented on the adversarial nature of the
criminal justice process. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) ("[a] criminal trial is not a
'game'"); Williams v. Forida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, n.12 (1969) ("The adversarial system of trial is
hardly an end in itself, it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right to
always conceal their cards until played.").
41. Van Kessel, supra note 40, at 448.
42. Van Kessel, supra note 40, at 409 (citing DAVID W. PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT
AND COUNSEL 9 (1954), Monroe H. Friedman, Professional Responsibility oftheDefens Lauyer. The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L REV. 1469, 1470 (1966), and Monroe H. Friedman, Judge
Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1065 (1975)).
43. See Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh, Questioning the Cullural and Gender-Based Assumptions of the
Adversary System: Voices of Asian-American Law Students, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 125, 129 (1992)
(noting that an attorney knows he or she is required to aggressively participate in the adversarial
system if the process is to operate correctly. However, the goal of each adversary is not
necessarily to determine the truth, but to present his or her client in the best light possible -
which may or may not be an entirely accurate portrait (noted in David Luban, The Adversary
System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 90 (1983)); SEYMOUR, supra note 1, at 24 (describing the
adversary system not only as a method of fact presentation and cross-examination calculated to
elicit the truth, but also as a process that unfortunately "is the worst sort of perversion of what
this legal philosophy is all about. To make a game of wits out of a serious proceeding in which
a man's liberty and the protection of society are at stake is a grotesque charade. Just this sort
of thing has made the general public cynical about the administration ofjustice and the role
of lawyers.").
44. Oh, supra note 43, at 129 (1992) (citing David Luban, TheAdversary System Excuse, in THE
GOOD LAWYER 90 (1983); Malcolm Feeley, The Adversary System, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
JUDICIAL SySmEMS 753 (1987)) (defining the term "adversary system" as the
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the fact-finder will be able to make an informed, thoughtful, and
equitable judgment after hearing the strongest case of both sides.'
In addition to its strengths, though, an adversary system also has
intrinsic weaknesses: advocates seeking to hide information damaging
to their clients, a discovery process that may not always lead to all of
the truth sought, and strict rules of court procedure include some
examples.' It is virtually impossible to find the truth or reach
justice under such circumstances. Attorneys will often ruthlessly
pursue success instead of the truth; it is the nature of the adversarial
process to prompt and even facilitate such behavior.47
In addition, as it is presently, litigation is not an ideal means of
building community: its procedures and its impact do much to sow
mistrust, and its limited successes may blind us to the need for
reforms that lie outside the ceaseless cycle of plaintiff and defen-
dant. As long as people are being harmed by human activities,
litigation remains at best a short-term answer.
48
On the other hand, justice looks toward the future, the long-term. It
seeks to widen the inquiry. Attorneys are specifically trained to be
logical and precise and to analyze and classify people and their
actions; later they will utilize their training to convince judges and
juries that their clients belong in certain categories and not others.49
However, recognition of the fact that parties involved in litigation may
have to carry on a relationship in the future, or that their lives may
hang in the balance, is one step toward making justice a dominant
characteristic of the judicial system." The legal system is an essential
piece of today's society as it serves to protect and promote justice. As
such, it must be remembered that the significance of lawyers should
method of adjudication characterized by three things: an impartial tribunal of defined
jurisdiction, formal procedural rules, and ... assignment to the parties of the
responsibility to present their own cases and challenge their opponents. In theory,
advocates are partisan representatives who bring the issues and all relevant legal
principles and arguments to the attention of the fact-finder and decision-maker. The
jury orjudge, who is passive in the investigation and presentation of the dispute, then
determines which arguments are more persuasive and declares its proponent the
winner. These features make the adversary system closely analogous to a battle or
sporting event where litigants' advocates are the players and the judge or jury is the
umpire.).
45. Van Kessel, supra note 40, at 418.
46. Van Kessel, supra note 40, at 418.
47. Van Kessel, supra note 40, at 454-55.
48. LIEBERMAN, supra note 10, at 186.
49. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE LJ. 447, 499 (1984).
50. See generally, Karst, supra note 49, at 490 (noting that smaller communities attempt to
"resolve disputes in a way that preserves the connections among people.") Such a procedure,
the author comments, is one way of preserving justice. Id. at 491.
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not be underestimated; for they are a means of communication
between the legal system and the world it is intended to protect."
Not only do the parties to the dispute benefit from a contextual
approach to the law, society also benefits. 2 Rights are not absolute,
and it is important for people to make careful, thoughtful decisions
and to also assume full responsibility for the consequences of those
choices.5" Making decisions with care also obliterates the need for
an adversarial battle. Lines of communication are opened when
parties observe each other making efforts to understand their
interests. Lawyers are then able to take a more conciliatory approach
to dispute resolution.
Although the search for truth has not been explicitly made high
priority in the justice-oriented system, sometimes it is important not
to focus solely on a logical, analytical approach but instead to
consider the human aspect of a case in order to do what is right. 4
It may be possible, therefore, to have justice without a complete
determination of truth.55
The following sections propose that through the efforts of women
trial attorneys, it is possible to alter litigation and to implement the
human contextual approach by adopting the "morality of care." As
it is presently, a belief in rights guides litigation. Care-oriented
thinking, however, offers the potential for a corrective shift from
"unbridled zealous advocacy," which has little regard for the social
and individual consequences of professional acts.5"
51. Bertha Rembaugh, Women in the Law, 66 N.Y.U. L REV. 2014, 2017 (1991).
52. See generally LuCAS, supra note 7, at 18-19 & n.31 (1980) (explaining that a rational
individual will abide by the laws of society, even though he or she may disagree with the
necessity of all of those rules, because of an awareness that society-andjustice-are dependent
upon people and their interaction with other people:
I can be happy to be one of We, if We are just, because then We will treat Me as one
of Us, because We know that 1, beingjust, will see things from Our point of view, and
will not exclude wider considerations from My assessment of the situation, and will not
construe everything in terms of My own exclusive self-interest. I can be sure that We
will do well by Me, and We can count on My behaving as a member of the community
should.).
53. Ellmann, supra note 22, at 2717 (paraphrasing a quote contained in CAROL GILLICAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE supra note 17, at 148).
54. Karst, supra note 49, at 499 (1984).
55. As noted earlier, the criminal system requires a determination of the truth because a
person's liberty is at stake, as well as the safety of society. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text. But the civil system may not require the same truth-seeking process in order to bringjustice
to the parties and society.
56. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 158.
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IV. THE MORALrIY OF RIGHTS VERSUS THE MORALrIY OF CARE
Personal morality develops over time as a product of complex moral
and social forces. Professional morality, i.e., the established ethical
obligations that come with a profession, is met by individuals fully
fashioned and ready to be slipped on like a new suit of clothes.
Ethical codes governing professional behavior may conform well with
an individual's personal morality, or they may not, depending on
whether one's personal ethics coincide with the values and goals that
characterize the profession. Conflicts of personal and professional
morality create dilemmas for individuals and place pressure on
institutions. 7
The highly adversarial and combative nature of litigation requires
certain behaviors of its participants that are unlike most professions.
Many who are drawn to the field of litigation have great difficulty
maintaining the relentless drive to "win" that is required by their
professional role. This is particularly true for those who, throughout
their lives, have always been concerned about the impact their actions
have on other people. Others, who were born to be legal warriors,
only see who is in the right and not what is necessarily beneficial to
society as a whole. These contrasting perceptions of social reality are
the product of psychological development." They are called the
"morality of care" and the "morality of rights." 9
57. JAcK &JAcK, supra note 5, at 1.
58. JACK & JACK, supra note 5, at 7. The authors assert:
Recent work on children's play confirms that at an early age girls and boys interact
differently. Girls choose smaller play groups, often consisting of two or three best
friends whose interactions are based on shared confidences. By comparison, boys'
groups are larger and tend to center on some competitive, goal-directed activity with
clear rules and with winners and losers. Boys learn to "depersonalize the attack," to
enter adversary relationships with friends and cooperate with people they dislike.
Whereas team games teach boys emotional discipline and self-control, traditional girls'
games reinforce nurturing skills, expression of personal feelings, and cooperation
rather than competition .... From early childhood, then, our culture prepares
females and males for different roles .... Experiences of most boys prepare them for
a world of advocacy, stoic detachment, autonomy, and suspension ofjudgment. Girls'
experiences usually instruct them for roles requiring sensitivity to others' feelings,
cooperation, involvement, and contextual understanding.
Id. at 131-32.
59. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 6 & 97.
From a care point of view, society is an interconnected, interdependent web of life.
The social fabric is woven of human relations and kept whole through responsiveness,
empathy, and unmediated personal interaction. By contrast, those with a rights
orientation experience society as composed of autonomous, separate individuals. A
hierarchy of rules, rights, and obligations mediate human interactions and help
preserve independence. Safety from aggression is found not in connection with others
but in rules protecting individuals from infringement.
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The "morality of rights" is the prominent viewpoint in the field of
litigation and society today.' The morality of rights views the
interaction among people as being governed by rules as well as
obligations and rights attending those rules.61  Rights proponents,
like the framers of the Constitution, rely on a system of checks and
balances for safety.6" Similarly, men who seek self-identity through
detachment perceive adulthood as synonymous with autonomy and
individual success. 63  As people formulate and nurture the legal
system, the system takes on the values of those who created it. Such
thinking is what has led to the adversarial nature of litigation.' It
should not be surprising, then, that the field of litigation, which has
been and still remains dominated by men,6 would reflect the need
Id at 97; Elmann, supra note 22, at 2668 (1993) (quoting Carol Gilligan from Moral Orientation
and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 10 (Eva F. Kittay & Diana T. Meters eds.,
1987) that "care is not simply an emotional response such as empathy, [n]or is it a gloss on
moral reasoning of a fundamentally different type .... Instead, 'care represents a way of
knowing and a coherent moral perspective.' This perspective emphasizes people's mutual
connections rather than their solitary autonomy.").
60. See generally JACK & JACK, supra note 5, at 22. Within a labyrinth of procedures to
ostensibly ensure fairness and uniformity in the application of law, institutions and individuals
compete for their rights in a way preferred by the predominantly male morality of rights.
STuART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLrrtcs OF RIGHTS 14 (1974) (stating that "[t]he principle
institutional mechanism of the myth of rights is litigation, which we are encouraged to view as
an effective means for obtaining declarations of rights from the courts, for assuring realization
of those rights, and for building a more just social order.").
61. JAcK &JACK, supra note 5, at 22.
62. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 8.
63. Karst, supra note 49, at 483.
Women, defining themselves as continuous with others, tend to equate maturity with
responsibility and care. Men typically see their relationships with others in contractual
terms, as derived from arm's length dealings among lonely contenders for places on
the ladder of hierarchy.. .. Men, abstracting human relationships from their particular
contexts, define morality andjustice in the vocabulary of rights - specifically, rights
to be free from interference of others. They seek protection against aggression in
abstract rules. Women distrust "a morality of rights and noninterference," because of
"its potentialjustification for indifference and unconcern." They define morality and
justice in the language of responsibility, seeking solutions for moral problems not in
impersonal abstract rules but in "the capacity to understand what someone else is
experiencing" and to avoid hurt to particular people in real human situations.... If
women tend to be deferential to others' judgments, that deference is not just the
product of social subordination; it also springs from a healthy moral concern for
others, growing out of an inclusive sense of self.
Id. at 483-84.
64. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 1.
65. HARRINGTON, supra note 13, at 129-30.
[T]he more aggressively hard-edged the practice, with trial work at the extreme, the
fewer women are involved. This is a fact, but the question is, Why. Has nature
programmed men hormonally to do battle and women to avoid it? Or do women shun
competition because the larger culture socializes them to dislike it, teaches them that
their virtue lies in sympathy, understanding, patience, cooperation, and peacemaking
rather than in combat) Or is it mainly a lack of practice? Would women feel more
comfortable as competitors if their families and schools and communities placed girls
in the same gladiatorial roles that boys assume from early childhood onward? Or is it
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to protect competing rights against intrusion.66 In a society of
limited resources, competition flourishes; however, the degree to
which competition leads to an uncompromising adversarial system
depends on how the disputes arising from that competition are
resolved.
An ethic of rights that is derived from abstract moral grounds and
is premised on identifying and protecting individual rights is but one
form of mature moral reasoning.' The other is the ethic or
"morality of care."
A care-oriented perspective sees society as an integrally connected
"web of life."' The "morality of care" differs from the "morality of
rights" in that it is not concerned with rights and duties, but
relationships between people. Paying deference to these relationships
by attempting to comprehend all of the concomitant concerns, the
"morality of care" recognizes a duty to minimize harm. 9 Women
most often personify the "morality of care" perspective. When faced
with moral dilemmas, women strive to preserve the "morality of care"
in the solutions they adopt because women regard relationships as a
part of their self-identity."0 Thus, a woman's perception of social
reality is in conflict with the axioms of the American legal system of
constitutions, statutes, administrative codes and case law. Specifically,
Rule 1.6 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct comments, "[a]lmost without exception, clients come to
lawyers in order to determine what their rights are, [not to find out
how to resolve their dispute so that all parties' interests are satis-
fied]."" Instead of attempting to mend relationships, this system of
rights, rules, and duties pit the involved parties as adversaries despite
their legal equality.72
that women, entering the legal profession with more social training than men in quiet
dispute-settling, see the lawyer's reliance on adversarial procedures as excessive? Are
women rejecting, as a matter of consciously formed critical judgment, the degree of
competition they find in the law? These are hard questions to answer because the
women themselves cannot know, with certainty, whether they are moved by uncon-
sciously held social teachings or consciously formed mature values. (Yet the answers
are important if women are to gain equal authority in the law.)
Id
66. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing the belief that men are "morality
of rights" thinkers and women are "morality of care" thinkers).
67. Ellmann, supra note 22, at 2665 (referring to an argument Carol Gilligan made in her
book IN A DIFFERENT VOICE supra note 17).
68. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 7.
69. Ellmann, supra note 22, at 2665.
70. Earst, supra note 49, at 483-84.
71. JACK & JACK, supra note 5, at 22.
72. JACK & JACK, supra note 5, at 22.
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Women generally reject the combative quality of litigation 73 and
find little motivation to "climb the ladder" in order to define
themselves.74 But if women litigators conform and do not challenge
the "morality of rights," women will never be able to influence the way
the judicial system operates.75 Furthermore, women litigators will
continue to be considered suspect,76 or worse, continue to face
gender bias77 in a profession in which they could be equally success-
ful. The care they have to offer to the system and society will
continue to be absent.78
The role of a trial lawyer is so unique, however, special consider-
ation must be given to how a woman might go about changing the
status-quo. The following section will explore the special terrain a
woman occupies as a trial lawyer.
V. THE TRIAL LAwYER'S ROLE
In order to understand the dilemma a woman faces when she
becomes a trial attorney and develops her professional style, goals,
73. See Oh, supra note 43, at 133 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology
of Women Lawyers, 24 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 897, 914 (1986) and noting that "women are less
comfortable with the hostility and combativeness that characterize the adversary system ...
[and] 'express dissatisfaction with the win or lose nature of litigation and the inability to effect
solutions that take account of all the parties' needs.").
74. Karst, supra note 49 at 487.
75. See HARRINGTON, supra note 13, at 58-59 (warning that silent women cannot transform
the content of the law).
76. See Schafran, supra note 3, at 37 (stating that even though women litigators vary in their
level of competence, their male counterparts' gender-based stereotypes overshadow women's
abilities and undermine their credibility).
77. For a sample of the literature and studies about gender bias in the legal profession,
from law school to the courtroom, see Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Toward a Courtroom of
One's Own: an Appellate Court Judge Looks at Gender Bias, 61 U. GIN. L. REv. 1209 (1993)
(discussing gender bias in the judicial system and the effects); Deborah Ruble Round, Gender
Bias in theJudidal System, 61 S. CAL- L. REV. 2193 (1988) (describing the effects of gender bias
on female attorneys); J. Stratton Shartel, Despite Some Improvements, Women Trial Lawyers Still Face
Gender Bias in Litigation (this article is adapted from an article that appeared in INSIDE
LITIGATION, Feb. 1992) (affirming gender bias in litigation); Judith Resnick, Gender Bias: rom
Classes to Courts 45 STAN. L. REv. 2195 (1993) (recounting efforts of the Ninth Circuit in
bridging the gender gap); Kathleen S. Bean, The Gender Gap in the Law School Classroom: Beyond
Survival 14 VT. L. REv. 23 (1989) (conveying gender bias in the law school); GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS: REPORT OF THE MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS, May 1989.
78. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspective On Legal Education,
45 STAN. L REV. 1547 (1993) (arguing that "values central to feminist analysis - care,
collaboration, and context - should also become more central to legal education and legal
practice."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New
Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987) (exploring the possibilities, hopes, and
consequences of integrating feminist approaches into the law). "The tricky issue, of course, is
whether the legal system will include and be transformed by these new constructions or whether
these constructions will be transmuted into a form that the lawmakers control." Id. at 30.
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and ethics, it is important to first understand the role79 of trial
attorney.80 Where most professional roles relate to a specific task,
the litigator's role "encompasses and intrudes."8 When a litigator
accepts a case, she first convinces herself; when she completes a
sketch of her brief, her initial skepticism dissolves, then, once she
appears before the court, her skepticism becomes a sincere convic-
tion.8 2  Such partisanship 3 is required by the profession. In fact,
a client has a strong legal and ethical claim in retaining an attorney
with a partisan stance. 4
Neutrality, 5 is equally crucial to the trial lawyer's role. As one
commentator notes, "[t]he successful advocate never allows ...
emotion to stand in the way of peak performance." 6 Neither does
the litigator pass judgment. 7 In order to avoid bias, an advocate
79. See generally JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 28 (explaining that social expectations and
institutional structures share one's conduct and affectations; thus, the role becomes part of a
person's identity).
80. See generally JACK & JACK, supra note 5, at 96 (explaining that the lawyer's role as an
advocate suspending judgment as to the truth or justice of that client's cause).
81. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 29.
As defined by tradition and by professional code, the job of a lawyer is to represent
vigorously the position and interests of a client, to take a client's place in the legal
process .... In a sense, the client has purchased more than a hired gun. The client
has also acquired a piece of the attorney's integrity, credibility, mind, and soul. The
lawyer stands in the client's shoes, thinks the client's thoughts, speaks the client's
words, advocates the client's position. The attorney is the client's mouthpiece, the
client's alter ego.
Id.
82. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Charles Curtis, a prominent Boston attorney).
83. JACK & JACK, supra note 5, at 32 (explaining that "Eplartisanship requires uncom-
promised devotion of an attorney to serving a client's interests. The loyalty of an attorney to
a client is exclusive and aggressive.").
84. JACK &JACM, supra note 5, at 32.
85. See JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 32 ("Neutrality, the second foundation block of the
lawyer's role, [partisanship being the first] requires an attorney to represent a client without
passing judgment on the character of the client or on the moral merits of the client's
position.").
86. COuic, supra note 2, at 362. "While [trial lawyers] get to know a client intimately
during the course of trial preparation and during a trial itself, lawyer and client usually do not
form long-lasting friendships. Nor do lawyers necessarily worry about who is in the wrong or in
the right. ... [L]awyers retain their distance from their clients. ... It is a security that
benefits us all." But see HAPMGTON, supra note 13, at 60 (arguing that it is impossible for
"human beings to detach themselves from their social identities and to analyze issues through
reason and logic alone.").
Feminists argue not only that this is impossible, that all thinkers carry socially shaped
perspectives with them, but that thinkers seeking a high degree of detachment miss the
concrete human detail that is a vital part of important issues. The further charge is
that in practice, the tradition of objectivity masks the very harms it is supposed to
prevent. It is supposed to prevent bias toward powerful or favored groups, but instead
allows the perspectives of socially dominant groups to dominate the law. And it
effectively silences those whose perspectives are different.
Id Ellmann, supra note 22, at 2693 (stating that a lawyer can evince deep interest and care for
her client without becoming personally engaged).
87. COUluc, supra note 2, at 362.
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must separate their own ideas from the words and thoughts of their
paying client. This will ensure moral and psychological well-being
and facilitate effective client representation. "Neutrality is an
indispensable part of being an attorney."'
Further, women litigators must balance their desire to be care-
oriented with the need to be assertive while in the court room.
89
Starting in law school, women learn that care-oriented behavior is not
always welcome in the American legal system." Especially in the
legal profession, which glorifies stoicism and combativeness, female
qualities are eschewed.91 This is an added burden for women
litigators. Women are aware that law schools teach only one method
of lawyering, and that if they wish to adopt other methods, they will
need to develop these alternatives on their own.9 2 Women experi-
ence life different from men; therefore, it is essential that they forge
their own paths and leave their own imprint on the legal profession.
Otherwise, women will just be playing a man's game by men's rules.
A primary problem for care-oriented trial attorneys" is what to do
with their personal morality when they enter the fights-oriented
practice of law.94 Many questions and options for adapting to the
attorney's role arise for women trial attorneys. The following section
discusses a few of them.
VI. WHETHER OR NOT TO ADAPT TO THE PROFESSIONAL ROLE OF
TRIAL ATTORNEY
Proper functioning of the legal system presupposes that lawyers will
fulfill their roles by conformity to the letter of the law.95 Thus, a
care-oriented litigator must make choices as to whether she will fully
adhere to the professional role, which requires that she be a fervent
advocate and exercise stoic detachment, whether she will reject the
prescribed role, or whether she will find some middle ground.95
88. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 40.
89. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 134 (quoting testimony of a male attorney before the New
Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women).
90. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 132-33.
91. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 133.
92. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 136.
93. JACK & JACK, supra note 5, at 33 (asserting that client partisanship and professional
neutrality strictly comprise the lawyer's moral universe without regard to the interests of others).
94. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 136.
95. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 95.
96. See genera!!yJanoff, supra note 18, at 207 (citing many journal and law review articles in
support of her proposition that choices must be made by women in the legal profession who are
experiencing conflict with the adversary system in order to survive).
James Foster explored how women feel about being advocates in an adversarial legal
process . ... He concluded that women in the legal profession are "reluctant
[Vol. 4:199
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While disassociating herself from the trial attorney role will not
benefit her, her client, or the judicial system, conformance 97 will
mean adopting male qualities to the potential exclusion of her care-
oriented tendencies. 8 By taking the middle ground, she may be
able to fulfill her professional role while retaining an acceptable level
of loyalty to her personal morality,"
Women must decide how their care-orientation fits into their
professional life as a trial attorney. It is as much a personal decision
as is what profession they will enter. Nevertheless, in order to achieve
success that can be equated with men's success as litigators, something
more radical must be suggested in order to have care-oriented
thinking be an integrated part of the judicial system" and, more
adversaries" who must choose between risking professional rejection by "articulating
nonadversarial values" and silencing their "women's voice" in joining the process.
Foster identified three strategies women use to survive law school. The women with
whom Foster spoke either joined in as "[one] of the boys," rejected adversariness
entirely, or decided to "[g]rimace and bear it." Foster identified problems inherent
in each choice. Women who adopted the first strategy had to remain silent. The
second strategy... was used by women who wanted to succeed by redefining success.
These women risked being stigmatized "first as women trying to play a man's game;
then as outsiders who want to change the game's rules; and finally as people who
repudiate being stigmatized." The majority of women chose the third strategy. These
women sought to work within the law school system, resigning themselves to the
adversary game. They did not give up their need to make meaningful human
connections, yet they were not blind to the fact that "[b] eing a lawyer requires that you
choose your battle ground."
Id.
97. See JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 42 (asserting that unlike the adversary system, morality
involves identifying with people on a human level, notjust being correct. This broadened moral
vision avoids both the parochialism of total role identification and the alienation that attends
rejection of that role.).
98. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 136; see also HARRINGTON, supra note 13, at 60 (quoting
UCLA law professor Kimberle Crenshaw, who says that "[t]o play the game right, [minorities]
have to assume a stance that denies their own identity and requires them to adopt an apparently
objective stance as the given starting point of analysis."); Martha Siegel, A Practitioner's Guide to
FeministJun spnedencp, B.BJ., Oct. 1993, at 6 (stating that there is "an inherent tension between
... [the] standard of how 'to think like a lawyer' and the evidence that women and men may
process information differently," which suggests that "when law schools teach us 'to think like
a lawyer,' they may really teach us to 'think like a man.'").
99. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 42.
100. See generallyJACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 169-70.
[T]wo factors make it possible to bring care thinking into law without risking legal
anarchy and demagoguery. First, the rights morality of law is well established and will
not yield easily, at most, care concerns will integrate and provide balance. The
moorings of conventional wisdom remain a check against arbitrariness and arrogance.
Second, morality of care is not simply the personal predilection of individuals. It is
itself a conventional wisdom, one shared by a large part of our society, and one well
tempered in its own province. By definition, the rules are not clear because the
thinking is not rule-bound, but underlying principles and assumptions are well
understood. Thus, ultimately we are talking not about blending institutional and
idiosyncratic moralities but about combining two moral viewpoints, each of which has
a well-established social tradition.
JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 169-79.
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particularly, the litigation process. Women must go to the heart of
the legal system to find their equal place beside men; not behind
them, and, not necessarily in front of them. Not only is reform
required to steer legal education toward a care-oriented mindset, but
needed to broaden the moral development of all lawyers for the
betterment of society as a whole. 1 1
One of the most viable alternatives available to transform litigation
into a more care-oriented system is to add care-oriented exceptions
to the litigation process. 02 Such exceptions would serve as institu-
tional encouragement to moderate partisanship and neutrality when
needed and possible.0 3 The exception could provide an opportuni-
ty to consult with peers when a litigator is facing a moral predica-
ment, or even require them to do so or be subject to disciplinary
hearings and a penalty. The exceptions would need to be well
outlined in the ethical rules, yet allow a reasonable amount of
discretion for the litigator to make necessary ethical decisions in a
case °4 The exception would allow for litigation to consider the
parties' interests and community needs. Consequently, the "morality
of care" and the "morality of rights" could be integrated into both the
legal system and the professional lives of trial attorneys."
Implementing theories behind alternative dispute resolu-
tion'° (ADR) is another option available to add more care-oriented
elements to the litigation process. The failure to communicate,
resulting from distrust between the parties, is responsible for
hindering the resolution of disputes. Alternative dispute resolution
seeks to overcome the distrust, thereby allowing a settlement similar
to one that a court would have reached. 7 Many trial lawyers fear
that they would be out of a job if alternative dispute resolution
101. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 168.
102. Elmann, supra note 22, at 2724 (describing an alternative to the present responsibility
of lawyers to their clients, the author suggests "admit[ing], or rather announcling], in the rules
of ethics that they are subject to exceptions when considerations of care justify making them.").
103. SeeJACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 161 (stating the lawyering profession has gotten where
it has because of the possibility that lawyers might be able to do some good and have a
responsibility to do so).
104. See Ellmann, supra note 22, at 2724-25 (suggesting that consulting peers, both lawyers
and non-lawyers, may help resolve ethical dilemmas).
105. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 157.
106. Agencies that provide services or advocate alternative dispute resolution include the
American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, the Better Business Bureau, the
American Arbitration Association, the Multi-Door Section of District of Columbia Superior
Court, NOVA, SPIDR, Endispute, and the Center for Public Resources. There is also endless
litigation on the pros and cons of alternative dispute resolution in every possible field of law
which I do not attempt to go into at this time.
107. Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lesons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mvement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424,427 (1986).
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replaced its courtroom counterpart; however, the ideals of ADR, i.e.,
opening communication and building trust between parties, may help
such attorneys to recognize that "we are interconnected parts of a
community and that individual freedom and community conflict only
at their extremes."'0 3 Similar to ADR, a care-oriented judicial system
seeks to open the range of inquiry beyond the immediate rights of
the respective parties to show them the independent effect that they
have on each other, as well as society. The adversary system, on the
other hand, operates on a theory of "fundamental distrust"' and
offers only a win/lose resolution for the parties involved, with no
thought to the effect on society.
It is possible that the sheer numbers of women entering the legal
profession will mean that a more care-oriented perspective will
become integrated into the present rights-oriented judicial system.
After all, the legal profession is organic and susceptible to a certain
inevitable degree of change.' However, for the women who are
presently, or who soon will be trial attorneys, something needs to be
done if they are to escape the "double-bind."
VII. CONCLUSION
Both care and rights speak to a quality ofjustice. From our cultural
perspective, a society where people are not free to speak, interact,
form alliances, strive for achievement, and guard against governmen-
tal intrusion, is not a just society. Likewise, a society of plenty where
some people lack basic necessities of food, shelter, and health care,
where fellow humans do not respond to unjustifiable harm, is not a
just society. Both the rights-oriented approach and the care-oriented
approach aim at ajust society, and each checks the faults and excesses
of the other. Both have something vital to offer and recognize that
human welfare is not complete without the contribution of each.'
Individuals should not have to compromise their desire to develop
their identities and achieve according to their abilities."' Converse-
ly, freedom and individual liberty cannot come at the expense of
society as a whole. Our fate is inextricably linked with those around
us."3 Therefore, trial lawyer's professional and societal duty is to
ensure that the fight for legal rights does not harm others. How
108. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 157.
109. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 107, at 427.
110. Schafran, supra note 3, at 41.
111. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 171.
112. JAK &JAcK, supra note 5, at 170.
113. JACK &JACK, supra note 5, at 170.
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seriously a trial lawyer takes that obligation may depend on his or her
personal morality. Those with a personal morality of the rights
perspective will tend to see only the need to lay down boundaries,
keep others at arm's length, and stake a claim to what the client
legally deserves. On the other hand, a care-oriented thinker will
prefer to understand the interests of the parties and argue based on
what each party needs. The adversary system of litigation, however,
has perpetuated the concept of courtroom warfare, making it difficult
to break centuries of adversarial procedures. We need to move away
from the purely adversarial system because justice is sacrificed by
those procedures and because it moves society farther and further
away from the recognition that group success is more beneficial than
individual achievement. When one party wins in litigation, victory is
felt only by that one party and the loosing party is left without his or
her interests being met or even, possibly, considered. Justice should
be concerned with taking both parties' interests into account and
judging from that care-oriented perspective. Present litigation
practices ignore that people frequently sue for underlying interper-
sonal reasons. If the system does not address those interpersonal
dynamics and instead perpetuates conflict, the clients will not
ultimately be satisfied and justice will suffer.
Rights-oriented litigators and care-oriented litigators seem to be
divided among gender lines; men tend to be rights-oriented, while
more women tend to be care-oriented. Adapting to the role of a trial
lawyer may be more difficult for a woman at the outset because
litigation is inherently right-based and the characteristics of a litigator
are aggressive and dominating, but men have to live with the
consequences of adversarial battles that ignore human considerations
just as much as women do. It behooves men and women alike, then,
to not forget that we are part of a human race, not a rat race.
[Vol. 4:199
